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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review this matter persuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §78-2-2(3)(e)(ii). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Did the Utah State Tax Commission err in determining the amount of penalty 
owed by Petitioner? 
2. Did the Utah State Tax Commission err in holding that Utah Code Ann. §59-
15-5.1 (1953) as effective as of June 15,1986 was not so vague as to be 
unconstitutional? 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. §59-15-5.1 (1953). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Utah State Tax Commission 
(the Commission) in Chris & Dick's Lumber & Hardware v. Collection Division of the 
State Tax Commission of Utah Appeal No. 87 0276. In this decision the 
Commission found that Petitioner had violated U.C.A. §59-15-5.1 due to 
Petitioner's negligence and that petitioner was therefore subject to the penalty 
provisions of U.C.A. §59-15-5.1(3). Applying the statute to Petitioner's late 
payment of taxes, in the amount of $92,874.93, the Commission assessed a 
penalty of $9,287.00. The Commission also determined that the wording of §59-
15-5.1(3) was not unconstitutionally vague. 
In this appeal Petitioner admits that it was negligent and that the negligence 
resulted in a violation of the statute. Appellants Brief P.2. Petitioner claims 
however that the Commission failed to compute the amount of the penalty 
correctly and that the statute (§ 59-15-5.1(3)) is unconstitutionally vague and 
therefore unenforceable. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Utah Code Ann. §59-15-5.1 (1953) requires certain entities to prepay not less 
than 90% of the amount of state and local sales tax liability for April and May of 
each year. This amount is to be paid to the Tax Commission on the 15th of June. 
Prepayment in this context means that instead of the normal July 31 due date for 
the remittance of the state and local moneys collected by the merchant, the 
merchant must send 90% of those moneys collected in April and May to the State 
a few weeks earlier. 
In 1986 Petitioner failed to file a return and make a prepayment as required by 
the U.C.A. §59-15-5.1. Some thirty eight days later the Petitioner did send in the 
required return. 
On August 11,1986 Petitioner mailed a request for a waiver of penalties due 
to the late filing of its return. By letter dated February 10,1987 Petitioner was 
informed that its request was denied. 
On or about September 29,1986 the Utah State Tax Commission sent 
Petitioner a Notice and Demand for Payment of Taxes. The notice requested 
payment of $12,484.95 and was comprised of $11,010.44 in penalty and $1,474.51 
in interest. 
On March 12, 1987 Petitioner filed a Petition for Redetermination. An informal 
hearing was held on May 15,1987, and a written informal decision was issued on 
October 5, 1987. 
The informal decision found that Petitioner was negligent in its late filing of the 
sales tax return and therefore subject to the 10% penalty listed in the statute. 
Based on additional information provided by the Petitioner the Commission 
determined that the actual amount of the late payment was $92,874.93 (rather than 
the $99,000 previously estimated by the Collections Division) and therefore that the 
correct amount of penalty was $9,287.00 plus interest. The Commission also 
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found that Utah Code Ann. §59-15-5.1(3) (1953) assessed a flat penalty of 10% of 
the amount of tax due, both before and after the 1986 amendment, and that 
Petitioner's claim that the penalty, prior to the amendment, was one apportioned 
on an annual basis was wrong. 
On October 26,1987 Petitioner filed a motion for a formal hearing. This formal 
hearing was held on March 9, 1988 and on April 19, 1988 the Commission issued 
a final decision affirming the findings and order of the informal hearing. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
I. The Utah State Tax Commission correctly calculated and assessed the 
penalty in this case. The relevant portion of §59-15-5(3) reads "In addition to any 
penalties for late payment provided in §59-15-5, there shall be a penalty of 10% 
of the total amount of the prepayment due from the date the prepayment return is 
due." (emphasis added). The statute provides for a penalty of 10% of the total 
amount of the prepayment, due any time after the taxpayer fails to file a complete 
timely return. The Commission computed the Petitioner's penalty in the manner 
required by the statute. 
The Commission's method of calculation is backed by the statutory language 
and long and consistent application by the Commission which is the agency 
charged by the legislature with administering the statute. Petitioner's method of 
calculation is not supported by anything other than Petitioner's desire for a lower 
penalty and a strained interpretation of what the legislature meant by changing the 
wording of the statute. 
Based on the language of the statute, the application of the statute by the 
Commission and the rules of statutory interpretation, the Commission calculated 
the Petitioner's penalty correctly. 
II. U.C.A. §59-15-5.1 is not so vague as to be unconstitutional. A statute is 
not so vague as to be unconstitutional if it is sufficiently explicit and clear to inform 
the ordinary reader of common intelligence what conduct is prohibited. In this 
instance the prohibited conduct is the filing of late sales tax returns. Petitioner 
knew what conduct was prohibited; and that a penalty would apply; its only 
assertion is that it couldn't understand how the penalty was computed. 
Even if this Court were to extend the requirement of clarity to encompass not 
only what conduct is prohibited but also the penalty for the conduct, the language 
in this statute, including the part that imposes the penalty, is clear and the 
application of the statute by the Commission consistent with the clear language. 
The changes in the statutory language were minor corrections eliminating some 
awkwardness in the language of the statute. Awkwardness in statutory language 
is not ambiguity. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION CORRECTLY DETERMINED THE 
AMOUNT OF PENALTY OWED BY PETITIONER? 
Petitioner admits it violated U.C.A. §59-15-5.1 (1953). Petitioner also admits 
that violation of this section of the code triggers the penalty provisions located in 
§59-15.1(3). Appellants Brief P.2. Petitioner disputes, however, the method used 
by the Utah State Tax Commission (the Commission) in calculating the amount of 
the penalty. 
The relevant portion of §59-15-5(3) reads "In addition to any other penalties 
for late payment provided in §59-15-5, there shall be a penalty of 10% of the total 
amount of the prepayment due from the date the prepayment return is due." 
(emphasis added). The statute provides for a penalty of 10% of the total amount 
of the prepayment, due any time after the taxpayer fails to file a complete timely 
return. 
Petitioner claims the above quoted paragraph really means that the penalty is 
10% per annum to be assessed proportionately over the year. However, Petitioner 
fails to adequately explain how it arrives at this strained interpretation of the 
statutory language. Nowhere in the statute is there any mention of an 
apportionment of the penalty over a year or any other period of time. Nor does the 
Petitioner quote any precedent for its construction or show where the penalty has 
ever been assessed on a per annum basis in the past. In fact Petitioner admits 
the statute did not call for a 10% per annum penalty. Appellants Brief P.7. 
Petitioner's sole support for its interpretation of §59-15-5.1(3) is the change 
made in the statute by H.B. No. 135, which was passed on February 26,1986. 
The change made by H.B. No. 135 relevant to this case was the striking of the last 
part of the sentence in §59-15-5.1(3) which read "from the date the prepayment 
return is due." Petitioner claims the change was made in order to make this 
section of the code "consistent with other tax statutes which require a flat penalty 
instead of an apportioned penalty." Appellants Brief P.4. 
There are two major flaws in Petitioner's argument. First, the Petitioner 
presumes that the statute was inconsistent with other statutes providing penalties. 
To the contrary, the statutory language was similar to that in §59-15-8 (1953) 
which provided for penalties for failure to file sales tax returns in situations other 
than that covered in §59-15-5. Additionally the penalty was consistently applied 
as a flat penalty rather than an apportioned one both before and after the 
amendments of the statute. There being no inconsistency, Petitioner's 
interpretation of the purpose of the statutory amendments is clearly wrong. 
The second major flaw in Petitioners argument is the presumption that a 
change in language is an indication of a change in the law. In Helverina v. New 
York Trust Co.. 292 U.S. 455 (1934), the United States Supreme Court held that a 
"mere change of language does not necessarily indicate intention to change the 
law...". In the current case the changes in language only reaffirmed the position 
that was already clearly established through both the plain language of the statute 
and the consistent application by the Commission. 
This Court has held "Where language of statute indicates legislative intention to 
commit broad discretion to agency to effectuate purposes of legislative scheme, 
Supreme Court will not substitute its judgment for that of agency as long as 
agency's interpretation has warrant in record and reasonable basis in law." 
Hodges v. Western Piling and Sheeting Co.. 717 P.2d 718 (Utah 1986). See also 
Concerned Parents of Step Children v. Mitchell. 645 P.2d 629 (Utah 1982). This is 
clearly such a case. 
The Legislature has granted the Commission broad powers in administering the 
State's tax statutes and the Commission's interpretation in this case follows both 
the clear language of the statute and the intent of the Legislature as demonstrated 
through its retention of the Commission's interpretation in the wording of the 
statute after its amendment. Indeed the amendment of the statute strengthens 
the Commission's construction rather than weakens it. Green River Community 
College. Dist. No. 10 v. Higher Ed. Personnel Bd.. 95 Wash. 2d 108, 622 P.2d 826 
(1980), aff'd. and mod., 95 Wash. 2d 962, 633 P.2d 1324 (1981). 
To accept Petitioner's interpretation of the statute, this Court would be forced 
to add the words "per annum" to the passage. Essentially, Petitioner is claiming 
that instead of a penalty of 10% , the statute requires interest of 10% on top of 
the interest already owed under §59-11-16 (1953). If the Legislature had intended 
to assess additional interest they would have done so. Instead they assessed a 
penalty which by common usage and application of the Commission is different 
from interest. "Foundational rules require that the Supreme Court assume that 
each term of a statute was used advisedly and that each should be given 
interpretation and application in accord with their usually accepted meaning, unless 
context otherwise requires." Grant v. Utah State Land Bd.. 26 Utah 2d 100, 485 
P.2d 1035 (1971). To accept Petitioner's interpretation would be to violate the 
"foundational rules" in Grant by changing the clear meaning of the words through 
the addition of unintended terms. 
The clear language of the statute, the long-standing construction of the statute 
by the Commission and the lack of any contrary authoritative constructions of the 
statute confirm that the Commission's computation of the penalty amount 
($9,287.00 plus interest) is correct. 
II. U.C.A. §59-15-5.1 (1953) AS EFFECTIVE JUNE 15, 1986, WAS NOT SO 
VAGUE AS TO BE UNCONSTITUTIONAL. 
Petitioner claims that "a statute is vague when it is insufficiently explicit and 
clear to inform the ordinary reader of common intelligence what the penalty for its 
breach is." Appellants Brief P.6. Petitioner further claims that §59-15-5.1 is 
vague, citing for authority for assertion that (a) Petitioner could not determine its 
penalty from the statute, (b) the Legislature changed the statute's language and (c) 
the Commission calculated three different sums while determining the proper 
amount of the penalty. Ibid. P.7. Based on these claims, Petitioner seeks to have 
this Court declare the statute as it was in effect on June 15,1986 null and void. 
In response to Petitioner's first claim, the cited authority does not state what 
Petitioner claims it does. Petitioner cites State v. Hoffman. 733 P.2d 502 (Utah 
1987) for the purpose of showing that a statute is unconstitutionally vague if the 
ordinary reader cannot tell what the penalty is. The actual language in the case 
reads "whether the statute is sufficiently explicit and clear to inform the ordinary 
reader of common intelligence what conduct is prohibited." Hoffman at 505. Citing 
State v. Pilcher. 636 P.2d 470, 471 (Utah 1981) (emphasis added). The actual 
language in Hoffman does not mention anything about penalties; rather, it follows 
the reasoning of this Court in State v. Theoboid. 645 P.2d 50 (Utah 1982). "In State 
v. Theoboid we held that 'a statute is not unconstitutionally vague if it is 
sufficiently explicit to inform the ordinary reader what conduct is prohibited." State 
v. Frampton. 737 P.2d 183 (Utah 1987). 
Petitioner knew what conduct- the late filing of its sales tax return and 
prepayment- was prohibited, and therefore the statute is not unconstitutionally 
vague according to this Court's previous definitions. However, even if this Court 
were to determine that the a statute is unconstitutionally vague if the ordinary 
reader cannot determine what the penalty is, in this case the plain and clear 
language of the statute makes it clear that the penalty for breach of the statute is 
a monetary penalty and that the penalty is a flat 10% of the amount that was 
owed. 
Petitioner's second claim is that the statute is unconstitutionally vague because 
the legislature made changes in the statutory language. In revising the relevant 
parts of the statute, the Legislature made only minor changes. The changes made 
by the Legislature had no effect on the construction placed on the statute by the 
Commission or on the Commission's application of the statute. The only practical 
effect of the changes was to relieve some of the awkwardness in the statute's 
language and thereby improve its readability. In United States v. Shirley. 359 U.S. 
255 (1959), the U.S. Supreme Court found that "awkwardness in statutory 
language is not ambiguity". In Shirley the Court was faced with determining the 
meaning of the term "person" within a federal statute. The Court determined that 
the fact "person" can have different meanings does not make it vague where the 
intent of the legislature is clear. The statute at question in this case, §59-15-1 (3) 
as effective on June 15,1986 was awkward, but it was not vague, and the intent 
of the legislature, as affirmed in their amendment, was that the penalty be applied 
as a flat penalty of 10% of the amount owed. 
Petitioner's final argument is the statute is vague because the Commission 
assessed three different penalty amounts. Petitioner claims that the first amount 
assessed was $9,900.00 on or about October 8,1986, followed by a penalty of 
$11,010.44 on October 13,1986, and finally a penalty of $9,287.00 on October 5, 
1987. The actual order was $11,010.44 on September 29,1986 (see Appellants 
Brief Exhibit A) followed by the $9,900.00, and finally the $9,287.00 on the dates 
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listed above. The first two penalty calculations were based on estimates by the 
Commission of the amount owed by the taxpayer, while the final correct figure was 
based on the actual figure as finally determined from information provided by the 
taxpayer. 
The Commission had no difficulty in determining the amount of the penalty. It 
was always assessed as 10% of the tax due which had not been paid at the time 
the return was due. The reason for the different figures was simply the result of 
better information becoming available, allowing the Commission to more accurately 
assess the penalty. The final figure ($9,287.00), having been calculated using 
actual, not estimated, data, is the correct figure. As for Petitioner's complaint that 
none of the figures match the number calculated by the Petitioner, that is simply 
because the Petitioner used an annualized apportionment formula which has no 
valid application for computing the penalty under this statute. 
The statute's meaning and intent were clear to an ordinary reader. Petitioner 
owes a penalty based on its breach of the statute, and that penalty is a flat 10% 
of the amount of the prepayment which was owed. Petitioner understood the 
statute and the fact that its breach would result in a penalty. Therefore, §59-15-
5.1 is not unconstitutionally vague and Petitioner's request that the statute be 
declared null and void must be rejected. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, Respondent respectfully requests that the 
decision of the Utah State Tax Commission be affirmed and that Petitioner be 
ordered to pay in full the penalty of $9,287.00 plus accrued interest. 
DATED this 26th day of August, 1988. 
M/MM <S,U<^\&&jiM 
BRYCJ^T PETTEY J 
Assistant Attorney General 
Tax & Business Regulation Division 
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